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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 8, 1964
Soviet Embassy,
Washington

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Amb. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Noted by DCI.
WE

COPIES TO: S - The Secretary
S/AL - Amb. Thompson
EUR - Mr. Tyler
ACDA - Mr. Fisher

I lunched alone with Amb. Dobrynin at his Embassy. I have accepted his invitations a couple of times a year. The conversation was informal and not very precise.

He complained about our press' allegation that the Soviet Union was upset over our recent trade negotiations with Rumania. He maintains that his government is delighted to have trade increased with Rumania. "Why not?" He minimized the independent action of Rumania in its discussions with Peiping. He expressed the opinion that a meeting of communist parties would be held in which the Chinese would be criticized.

We talked at some length about Laos. I underlined its importance as a symbol of the possibility of US-Soviet cooperation resulting from Vienna and Geneva. He went over familiar ground but avoided the issues. He concluded that the conflict with China would not change the Soviet Union's position on Southeast Asia.

He applauded the cooperation achieved in outer space, weather, and now de-salting. He said that he understood that our cost of producing power by nuclear energy was about the same as by other

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fuels and asked if this was true, and whether in the private sector more nuclear power plants would be built in this country. I told him I would check on this and let him know. I pointed out that the original cost of nuclear plants was high and that its greatest value was in areas where fuel costs were high. This was, of course, not the case in the United States.

He asked why we couldn't make some progress in the arms talks in Geneva. When he asked me what particular areas of agreement we might reach, I suggested the best way to find this out would be for Zorin to have a frank talk with Bill Foster. He went over some of the old ground of the Warsaw proposal of denuclearizing Central Europe, MLF, etc. He concluded it was possible to come to an agreement on an African demilitarized zone and argued for inclusion of the Mediterranean, which I, of course, scotched.

I commented upon the action that President Johnson took in reducing our production of fissionable material, and was glad to see that parallel action was taken by Mr. Khrushchev. Dobrynin said, "Why can't we do more of that?" I replied, "What have you got in mind?" He answered, "Each of us should reduce our forces in Germany." I said we had already done so. "Why don't you do the same thing?" I pointed out we had withdrawn some 10,000. He corrected me, "only 7,500," and suggested that wasn't enough to be meaningful.

He asked why we could not use slant photographs in Cuba. He argued that the U-2 photographs he had seen from the plane that was shot down in 1960 covered long distances both ways in considerable detail. I pointed out that complete photographic coverage was impossible on account of the terrain, and that it was as much in the Soviet interests as well as our own that the President be able to refute constant stories that Soviets were putting missiles into Cuba.

In answer to my question, he said that he had not had a report of the Benton talks with Khrushchev. I pointed out that one of the inconsistencies expressed by Mr. Khrushchev in these talks was that it was quite all right for the Soviet Union to help rebels, but it was quite improper for us to help governments suppress them.

On the coming General Assembly meeting, he mentioned that he believed the Soviet Union would agree to the enlargement of the Council to 15 members.

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He told me that he had received instructions from Mr. Khrushchev to thank me for the birthday telegram that I had sent him on his 70th anniversary. He seemed to know about what I had said in the message as he commented that mine was the most expressive, less formal than others. (I had expressed the hope that we would work together for more and better goulash for the peoples of the world.)

He told me that he was going on a trip around the country with his wife; expected to be back around the 4th or 5th of July. He accepted an invitation for them both to come and have a swim on their return. He said he wanted to have a last word with me before he left for Moscow about July 20.


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

June 17, 1964

The Honorable
John McCone
Director, CIA



As of possible interest.

W.A.H.